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INFORhfATION AND INCENTIVES: THE 

ECONOMICS OF CARROTS AND STICKS* 

James A. Mirrlees 
THE INVISIBLE HAND 
In a lecture that will deal chiefly with ignorance, it may seem natural to begin 
with  Adam  Smith's  most  famous contribution  to  economics,  his  vision  of 
independent selfish beings who by living and working together in the economic 
system somehow do what is best for one another. First, in The Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments, he said 
The rich only select from the heap what is precious and agreeable. They 
consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness 
and  rapacity ...they  divide  with  the  poor  the  produce  of  all  their 
improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same 
distribution of the necessaries of life which would have been made, had the 
earth  been  divided  into  equal  portions  among  all  its  inhabitants. 
(1V.i.I 0) 
This  is  far  from  the  later  conception  of  an economic  equilibrium  that  is 
'optimal' in Pareto's sense. Indeed as quoted, Smith's early claim is  not very 
plausible. It does set the major themes: the working of the economy as a system, 
and the good or otherwise, for everyone, that can flow from it. Later in the 
Wealth  of  Nations,  he  argued  correctly  that  individual  profit-maximisation 
implies maximisation of what we would call national income, and goes on to 
say that, 
...by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the 
greatest value, [every individual] infends only his own gain, and he is in 
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of his intention. (IV, Chapter 11) 
This says nothing about possible advantage to the poor, indeed nothing about 
the distribution of gains at all. 
As  taught to generations of economists,  there are two parts to the doctrine 
of  the  invisible hand. The first  is  that an economic  equilibrium  is  Pareto- 
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optimal: it is  an allocation of commodities and activities to people with the 
property that no other allocation could make everyone better off. It is a good 
allocation in rather a weak sense, but better for everyone than a lot of other 
possible allocations. The  economic equilibrium has to be perfectly competitive. 
The second part says that any Pareto-optimal allocation can be an economic 
equilibrium. For that to be, the initial distribution of assets among people has 
to be set right. It may be required that the earth is indeed divided into equal 
portions among its inhabitants for the desired allocation to emerge. This second 
proposition, at least in its standard form, makes assumptions about the nature 
of technological possibilities such that a perfectly competitive equilibrium can 
occur. Essentially economies of scale have to be excluded, or production levels 
in such industries determined in some other way, for example by some kind of 
planning. That is  an interesting issue, but will be ignored here.' 
These propositions  were  the  essential  content of  welfare  economics  as  I 
learned it in the fifties. Ian Little (1950) and particularly Jan Graaff (1957) 
brought out the many serious difficulties in the theory, particularly if it were 
to be taken as a basis for economic advice and policy and ideology. The theory 
underlay much of what economists thought they could tell the world and its 
rulers.  It was  the basis  for free  trade arguments, for  urging the control of 
monopoly,  for  methods  of  cost-benefit  analysis,  and  the  justification  of 
marginal-cost pricing by publicly-owned firms. It was also used to support the 
extension of free markets and private ownership of property, and to recommend 
the use of price systems even in planned economies. 
Yet the defects of the theory seemed serious. Many economic transactions 
take place between individual agents or firms, with significant monopoly on at 
least one side of the market. Taking a later view, that seems to be because of 
search  costs  and  switching  costs  and  uncertainty  about  the  fulfilment  of 
contracts in  the future  (as in  credit markets). These have  no place  in  the 
competitive model of the economy. One might possibly be able to claim that 
these deviations from the assumptions are small, within the margins of error 
that economics can aspire too; though for myself I do not think they are. 
The other major defect is the need to have a particular distribution of assets 
to  people before one can claim that the resulting equilibrium is  good. That 
requirement, when properly understood, was plainly impossible to fulfil. 
What is the nature of this difficulty? It had, I think, become quite clear by 
the fifties. It was clear in William Vickrey's writings, for example.'  If we are to 
have a good equilibrium, we shall have to imagine a good government that 
does what is needed, namely to create a distribution of assets to people such that 
the  desired  allocation  is  indeed  an equilibrium.  It can  be  done.  In one 
exceedingly  simple  model,  which  perhaps  many  economists  had  in  mind, 
people  are  all  the  same,  and  each  person  obtains  utility  from  a  single 
consumption good, of which a fixed amount is available. Then it is easy for the 
government to do it. Assuming diminishing marginal utility of consumption, 
There are ways of  extending the proposition, discussed in Mirrlees (1gg5),and work referred to therein. 
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and comparability of individual utilities, an equal distribution of assets is what 
we require. No information, other than a census, is  required for that. People 
might have some doubts about the measurability,  perhaps  even  about the 
meaningfulness, of utility; but at least in a rough and ready way, there was a 
strong case for thinking that transfer from richer to poorer was an  improvement. 
Carrying that to the logical extreme, the riches of the earth should be equally 
distributed. 
It was not a popular policy, in part for good reasons. Obviously if a perfectly 
equalising policy were carried out, the ordinary incentive to work would  be 
eliminated. 'From each according to his  abilities,  to  each  according to his 
needs.'  (Karl Marx,  Criticism  of  the  Gotha  Programme)  is  not  thought  to  be 
feasible, even if desirable. Nothing in the simple model allowed for that. 
TAXATION 
What exactly was the problem? In  general, and in reality, the redistribution of 
assets required by the first welfare theorem needed information the government 
could  not obtain. This ideal government had to  know what wealth people 
already had, and what they were capable of doing, before it could work out 
how much to give and take. If people knew it needed that information, they 
could in one way or another dissemble, and would if it benefitted them to do 
so. The information requirements of  the second welfare  theorem cannot be 
fulfilled. Transfers to or from a person that depend on the characteristics of that 
person, not his behaviour, are known as lump-sum transfers. Desirable lump- 
sum transfers are, in effect, impossible, because they require information that 
is not available. The attempt to implement them would be expected to destroy 
the value of the information on which they would have to be based. 
Following that line of thought, in the mid-sixties, Peter Diamond and I were -
convinced that one should think about economic welfare and economic policy 
in the context of public finance. At first we studied a general economic model  -
in which the government was not able to use lump-sum transfers at alle3  Clearly 
that was going too far, and we went on to allow that the government could use 
uniform lump-sum taxes or, more plausibly, subsidies. Otherwise it had to use 
taxes,  taxes  that from  the point  of  view  of  the pure welfare  theorems  are 
regarded as distorting. This was a model in which ail consumers and producers 
were price takers, but they did not necessarily face the same prices, because tax 
rates could make the two parties to a transaction face different effective prices. 
It was  a  conventional model,  in  having  competitive  behaviour  of  private 
agents; but it was a distorted economy, and the distortion could be optimal. 
That was what we wanted to study. 
There was a significant earlier litkrature on distorting taxes. The theory had 
been  started by  Frank  Ramsey  (1g27), at the  request  of  A. C. Pigou.  He 
considered an economy of identical consumers and assumed that revenue had 
to be raised entirely through commodity taxes. M. Boiteux  (1956) in France 
had later, but independently, developed the isomorphic theory of pricing by a 
The theory we developed was eventually published in two papers, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) I314  THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL  [SEPTEMBER 
public utility with a zero-profit constraint, in an economy where, paradoxically, 
perfect  lump-sum  transfers  were  supposed  to  be  happening.  And  Serge-
Christophe Kolm (1971)  also developed a systematic general theory. 
What is interesting for the story I have to tell now is the form of the theory 
we developed, rather than its content and implications. It was the theory of a 
government whose actions were a function only of what it could observe. No 
observations about the nature of individual consumers  were  assumed  to be 
available, only observations of their behaviour. The leading example of that is 
a commodity tax, which provides revenue proportional to the quantity of the 
commodity consumers choose to buy. Policy choice takes account of consumer 
responses  to tax changes, namely changes in amounts purchased. A uniform 
lump-sum subsidy requires no information at all, and is therefore allowed. All 
these  policy  instruments  are,  as  we  say  now,  incentive-compatible:  the 
government takes full  account of people's  self-interested response to the tax 
system. 
There is one respect in which information about consumer characteristics is 
needed, the distribution of  these characteristics within  the population. The 
government somehow knows this distribution. In  principle it could obtain it by 
asking people, or putting them through various tests. Since the information is 
used only in aggregate form, an individual has nothing to lose  (or gain) by 
telling the government the truth. Only if individual tax liability were affected 
by these revelations would incentive-compatibility be violated. We supposed 
that the government would obtain and use an econometric model of consumers, 
in  which  the  distribution  of  consumer  types - their  intensity  of  taste  for 
different commodities, their labour supply characteristics -would be estimated 
from the behaviour of a sample of consumers. Calculations of optimal taxes and 
ofdesirable directions of tax change have been done on in that way. One  should 
allow explicitly for uncertainties about the distribution of characteristics in the 
population, with the budget-balancing issues it raises, but we did not trouble 
about what is a relatively minor complication. 
This then was  a model with  asymmetric information, where, at the time 
when  government  policy  is  determined,  individual  consumers  know  more 
about their tastes and abilities than the government does. Since all kinds of 
policy parameters could be mentioned in the model, it was quite general. That 
generality was not fully exploited. 
INCOME TAXATION 
It  is interesting to be more specific, and study a particular economic model that 
has some of the most salient features of real economies. One such model pictures 
the economy as timeless, with people enjoying a single consumption good, and 
supplying  labour.  As  mentioned  above,  William  Vickrey  had  stated  the 
optimum tax problem for such a model, though he was not able to solve it. In 
such a model, redistributive taxation can be described simply as an  income tax, 
which has the effect of determining each individual's consumption as a function 
of that individual's labour income. 19971  INFORMATION  AND INCENTIVES  '315 
The point about income taxation is  that tax can be a highly complicated 
function of income: tax need not be proportional to income, and in the real 
world  seldom  is.  In the  real  economy,  income  actually consists  of  several 
elements. It is  often easy  to distinguish between labour income and income 
from capital, conceptually  at least.  (In practice,  particularly with  the self- 
employed,  the distinction  might be  hard  to  enforce;  and net  income from 
capital, including housing, can itself be hard to measure.) In what follows, I 
shall assume we are dealing with labour income. Labour income can be taxed 
nonlinearly. So can a number of other commodities, such as telephone calls, 
electricity  and  the  like.  Fully  nonlinear  taxation  is,  like  linear  taxation, 
incentive-compatibility: the calculation  of  tax is  still  based  on  the publicly 
observable behaviour of the consumer. The presumption is  that nonlinearity 
will be advantageous, because more general than linear taxation. 
In practical  terms,  one  could  not  tell  in  advance  how  advantageous 
nonlinearities  might  be.  Most  countries  had  and  have  large difference  in 
marginal  labour-income  tax  rates,  and  in  most  cases  the  income-tax law 
specifies marginal tax rates that increase with income. There are also other 
elements in the social insurance and tax arrangements of countries that are very 
like a form of income taxation, e.g. unemployment insurance, or low-income 
support arrangements. In many cases, these have the effect of creating quite 
high  marginal  tax  rates  on  low  incomes:  benefits  are reduced  as  income 
increases, sometimes almost one-for-one. The typical real tax system, therefore, 
has high marginal tax rates for low incomes and for high incomes, and low 
marginal tax rates in the intermediate range. It is  tempting to think of most 
taxes, other than taxes on capital income, as amounting to a tax on labour 
income : that would be right if different consumer goods were taxed at the same 
rate. At any rate, one can approximate real tax systems quite closely in these 
terms. 
The next  step  in  thinking  about  an optimum  income-tax  system  was, 
paradoxically,  to  move  back  from  thinking  explicitly  about tax rates,  and 
instead to think about allocations of real commodities and labour. It proved to 
be  advantageous to go back  to  thinking about optimality as  in the general 
welfare economics from which all this work had begun, but now to have a new 
kind of constraint, incentive-compatibility, in addition to the constraint that 
the allocation should be feasible. The idea of incentive-compatible transfers by 
the government had been captured by thinking in terms of tax rates. But it is 
really a more fundamental idea. The question to ask was : what allocations are 
possible if policy has to be incentive-compatible? It  seemed best to think about 
this in a special model, but in fact the answer turned out to be quite simple in 
a fairly general model. 
The special model was one that had long seemed natural to me, in which 
individual consumers can choose how much labour to supply. Each consumer's 
situation is described by two variables, consumption and labour supply. Each 
consumer's type is defined by a single parameter, productivity, or, equivalently, 
that person's  wage  rate. There is  a given  distribution of  wage  rates in the 
economy, known to the government. These are real, the actual productivity of THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL  [SEPTEMBER 
Before-tax income 
Fig.  I. Incentive-compatibility. 
the different individuals. The  government can observe the total product of each 
individual, that is the product of the wage rate and the amount worked, but is 
unable to observe either of these alone. That observability assumption is a bit 
extreme, and I shall come back to it. But there are certainly severe limits on 
what the government can observe, and this particular assumption corresponds 
to what tax systems almost invariably do: they relate only to total income, not 
to wage rates. 
The  government was also supposed to have an aim, a measure of welfare that 
it wishes to maximise, a sum of individual utilities, consistent with individual 
preferences for consumption and work. That does not matter for the first step 
in the analysis, which is to find a way of describing the real allocations that are 
possible for the government, that is to say the real distributions of consumption 
and work  in  the  population  that  are incentive-compatible.  These  are the 
allocations that are possible with some labour-income tax system, but I wanted 
to describe what allocations were possible without reference to taxes, and that 
was the essential step to having a computable model of general taxes. 
I have said the answer was simple. It is shown in Fig.  I. For each consumer 
call the product of wage and labour, income. Incentive-compatibility required 
that each consumer would choose from a set of available consumption/income 
pairs. That set is defined by the allocation of consumption and income among 
consumers. A  curve, labelled BB'  in the diagram, describes  that allocation, 
showing consumption at different income levels. Each consumer chooses from 
that curve: each has an indifference curve tangential to the allocation curve, 
such as 11' and JJ' in the Figure. To  be more precise, what I have called a curve 
might, technically, not be: it could well have corners. Still, it followed from this 
simple argument that the curve must be a lower envelope to a collection of 
individual indifference curves, one for each type of consumer. As a consequence, 
utility increased as the wage increased, at a rate equal to the derivative  of 
utility with respect  to the wage, holding consumption and income constant. 19971  INFORMATION  AND INCENTIVES  1317 
And also income was an increasing function of the consumer's wage rate. These 
two  facts  together  fully  characterised  the  set  of  incentive-compatible 
consumption/income allocations. 
One key  assumption  was  needed  to justify  that conclusion.  It had to be 
assumed that people with higher wage rates always found it easier to produce 
more income (by working) than those with smaller. That is  more restrictive 
than it sounds, and is  much more than a definition of increasing wage, but 
seems  an entirely  reasonable  and plausible  assumption.  In the Figure, the 
assumption means that different people's indifference curves cross one another 
once  only.  The  condition  is  known  as  the  single-crossing  property  (or 
sometimes the Spence-Mirrlees  condition4).  With that assumption, one had a 
full characterisation of incentive-compatible allocations. 
Furthermore, and crucially, the original optimal-income-tax problem could 
now be converted into something very like a standard control-theory problem, 
with utility as the state variable, income the control variable. The envelope 
condition just described was essentially equivalent to a statement that the rate 
at  which utility increased in the population, with respect to the wage rate, was 
equal to the partial derivative of  the individual's  utility with respect  to the 
wage rate,  just a known function of that individual's consumption, income, and 
wage. To  tell a little more of the truth, one has to generalise all this somewhat, 
for utility may not always be smooth function of the wage. Consequently, the 
full  mathematical justification  of  all this  is  quite complex. Computation of 
results was not trivial either, because in fact one had to check whether there 
were ranges of consumers all of whom would make the same income, but it 
could be done.5 
An exciting feature of this analysis, and one that came as a complete surprise, 
was its validity. That puts the issue too starkly. Let us rather say that the use 
of  fully  nonlinear  taxation  does  solve  one  problem  that  has  troubled  tax 
theorists. In  the optimal commodity tax analysis that Peter Diamond and I had 
done, we had obtained first-order conditions for optimal taxes, and explored 
various interpretations and implications; but these conditions were necessary 
conditions for optimality, not sufficient conditions. In any particular  model, 
computation of optimal taxes should require much more than solving the first- 
order conditions, unless by good fortune there were a unique solution. That 
problem  need  not  afflict  simple  welfare  economics  with  perfect  lump-sum 
transfers.  In the  income-tax  problem,  relatively  simple  conditions,  easily 
checked for the particular model I was using, implied that the solution of the 
equations  did  give  an optimum:  the conditions  were  sufficient  as well  as 
necessary. When the computations were done, one knew  one had the right 
answer, not just an answer that might be right. 
Solution of the model in any particular case shows how consumption should 
be  related  to  income.  From  that  one  can  talk  about  income  tax  rates, 
interpreting the difference between income and consumption as tax. Remember 
*  Michael Spence (1973)used the condition for models of markets with asymmetric information. 
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Fig. r. Optimal income-tax achedulei. .Source: Tuomala :1984)./? = I  mealla welfare is  the sum of 
utilities.  t is  the consumer elasticity of substitution betneen consumption and labour. 
that in the model, the allocation would  be achieved with just  that tax. The 
income tax in  the model  corresponds  to  the sum  of  the  real-world  labour- 
incomes taxes and taxes on consumption, such as value-added tax. 
Computation of the model was done for particular cases. There are three key 
assumptions: the distribution of wages,  the nature of individual preferences 
between  consumption  and  work,  and  the  extent  to  which  it  is  supposed 
desirable to transfer from the better off to the less well off, i.e. the way that the 
welfare  function incorporates individual preferences.  In the  I 97I  paper, the 
simplest  reasonable  assumption  was  made  about  consumption/work 
preferences,  namely unit elasticity  of substitution between  consumption and 
leisure. At least for male workers, work since then suggests  that elasticity is 
considerably too high. Later work6 shows that marginal rates of tax should as 
a  consequence  be  greater  than  they  were  in  these  first  calculations.  The 
distribution  of  labour incomes is  not  all  that easy  to observe.  In any case 
intertemporal aspects are important in the real world and completely absent in 
the model. Both log-normal distributions and distributions with  Pareto tails 
were tried, and gave distinctly different results, particularly at upper incomes. 
Different welfare specifications had much more effect at low incomes than high, 
and there  are good  theoretical  grounds for  that. X  required  level  of public 
expenditure (on defence, police, etc., not welfare spending, which is part of the 
optimal tax system) was also postulated. 
The  kinds  of  results  obtained  are  illustrated  in  Figs  2  and  3,  giving 
calculations by Matti Tuomala. The two parameters, P  and  t, describe the 
degree of  egalitarianism assumed, and the elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and labour-supply.  H = I  corresponds to the cases calculated in 
the  197I  paper, H = 0.5 is  probably a more realistic value. 
Several things were striking about the results. In many cases, marginal tax 
rates were highest in the middle of the range of incomes, and fell towards higher 
Tuomala  1990 INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES 
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Fig. 3. Marginal  tax rates. Source: Tuomala (1984). 
incomes and lower. This was the opposite of actual tax systems. It  was a feature 
that at that time seemed quite robust, though later computations and results 
suggest that marginal tax rates can be quite high at the lowest incomes. (With 
a very  highly  egalitarian  form of  welfare judgment,  the marginal  tax rate 
appears  to  fall  all  the  way  up  the  income  range.)  Another  result,  not 
numerically  very  striking, but on consideration  important, was  that it was 
optimal to have a positive amount of unemployment. People who chose to earn 
no income at all are paid a subsidy, since we did not wish them to starve, and 
those  with  very  low  productivity  therefore found pay insufficient  to justify 
working. 
One can get some insight into the problem and the results by thinking about 
an extreme case where inequality of incomes is rather low. The  limiting case is 
where everyone has the same income. Then there is no incentive-compatibility 
problem. It is optimal to raise the funds required for pure public expenditure 
by a lump-sum tax. The marginal tax rate is zero. Now let there be a little 
inequality, with wages ranging all the way from zero to some high level, but a 
small variance. For people in the middle of the wage range (who are most of 
the population) taxes should be very similar to what they were in the equal- 
wages case, i.e. a low marginal tax rate, and an average tax rate big enough 
to pay for public expenditure. But that cannot apply to people on the lowest 
incomes, because they could not have paid that lump-sum tax -it would have 
meant  negative  consumption.  The  consumption  income  schedule  must 
therefore be curved at the lower end, always remaining below the indifference 
curve of an average-wage earner. One  cannot see from this argument quite how 
low the gradient of the consumption/income schedule should be at the lower 
end, but it will surely be a lot lower than at the average income, which is  to 
say that the marginal tax rate will be much higher at the lower end than in the 
middle. 
As  the  wage  distribution gets  more  unequal,  the  optimal  consumption/ 
income schedule changes in shape in quite a complicated way. Another possible I 320  THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL  [SEPTEMBER 
reason for high marginal tax rates in the lower range can come into play. If 
people in fact like to  do some work, it may not be so important to provide 
labour incentives to people with low wage rates. That can mean tax rates at or 
close to  IOOO/~ can be optimal at the bottom of the income range. In higher 
ranges, recent  work  of  Peter  Diamond, as yet  unpublished, shows that the 
inverted U-shape of the consumption/income schedule is quite common, with 
marginal tax rates rising at the mode of the distribution, but eventually falling. 
There have been further qualitative results of interest for this model and its 
generalisations. The  best known is that ofPhelps (1973)  and Sadka (1976)  that 
the optimal marginal tax rate for the highest-wage  person  (if there is one) is 
zero. In my own paper, all wage distributions were unbounded  above. The 
Phelps-Sadka  result  really says that the highest  income that could possibly 
happen should be subject to a zero marginal tax rate. There is  considerable 
uncertainty about the actual highest income: it is very unlikely to be close to 
the level at which the marginal tax would be zero. 
There is an important general result due to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who 
found nice general conditions for a model with many consumption goods to 
have the property  that the optimum can be  obtained  using only a labour- 
income tax. This turns on separability of  consumption goods in preferences 
from  labour  and  consumer  characteristics.  If  these  conditions  hold  for 
intertemporal preferences, it follows that one should not have a tax on capital 
income: that is the case where a uniform expenditure tax is optimal. There is 
a closely related result of Christiansen (I  98I  that when there -is a public good 
grouped  with  the  private  consumption goods,  separately from  labour  and 
wage,  the  Samuelson  public  good  rule,  that  the sum of  marginal  rates  of 
substitution should  equal the marginal rate of  transformation, holds. These 
results require the possibility of arbitrary nonlinear taxation of labour income, 
which  is  perfectly  reasonable.  It is  interesting  that  the  general  model  of 
incentive-compatible systems gives results so much neater than those obtainable 
when only linear taxation is  allowed. 
Finally, it is worth remarking that the model is more general than it looks, 
for  income  in  the  model  is  visible  income,  and  consumption  is  what  the 
consumer  is  seen  to  be  paid,  net.  Tax  evasion  can  perfectly  well  be 
accommodated in the structure, with the consumption variable being apparent 
after-tax income, and income what is reported to the tax authority. What is 
missing then is other kinds of inspection and assessment. But that could be used 
even without  deliberate tax evasion. In some countries, the possibility  that 
evasion varies with the level of taxes is  believed  to be more important than 
variations in labour supply. 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
The tax model we have been considering is only one situation in which there 
is asymmetric information between a principal (here the government) and an 
agent or agents (the consumers). The individual consumer knows more about 
his or her own capabilities than the government. The  government can think of '9971  INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES  1321 
itself  as  dealing  with  a  representative  consumer,  but  not  knowing  that 
consumer's type. Many economic relationships are of the principal-agent  type, 
particularly employer-employee  relationships. The kind of analysis I outlined 
applies when the agent's performance is  observable and measurable, but the 
agent  knows  more  than  the  principal,  for  example  about  the  relationship 
between unobservable effort and performance. Adam Smith knew there was a 
problem (although he does not explicitly mention the uncertainties that make 
shirking possible) : 
It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and 
if his emoluments are to be precisely  the same, whether he does, or does 
not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest, at least 
as interest is vulgarly understood either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is 
subject to some authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform 
it  in  as  careless  and slovenly  a  manner  as that  authority will  permit. 
( Wealth of  Nations, V.i.f.7). 
It might be thought that he is too neglectful of monetary incentive systems, but 
it is important to be reminded that authority could be a good description of the 
relationship. An optimal payment system, with asymmetric information, could 
well  have  an authoritarian  character, if  it showed  pay  rising  rapidly with 
performance  over some range, low  at lower  incomes,  and not  rising  much 
further at higher. That would come close to the principal saying: Do this, or 
else. It is  an interesting feature of the schedules found  to be optimal in the 
income-tax problem  that consumption never rises more rapidly than income 
(equivalently,  the marginal tax rate is never negative). Most probably, so harsh 
a relationship is never optimal in realistic cases of asymmetric information.' 
The employment relationship raises many interesting new possibilities, such 
as relating pay to other people's performance. That is not worth doing if the 
two people are quite unrelated, in that their abilities are uncorrelated. When 
they are correlated, and the agents cannot or do not combine together, there 
is indeed scope for having pay depend to some extent on relative performance. 
We probably do not expect to have our government introduce taxes that 
depend on our neighbour's (or distant competitor's) income as well as our own. 
But such possibilities have played an interesting role in the further development 
of  mechanism  design  beyond  the simple  model  of  asymmetric  information 
described above. Agents can be asked to choose among much more complex 
sets of messages than we would  use to describe their simple performance or 
income. Maskin (1985)  introduced the idea of asking people to place themselves 
in  the  overall  wage  distribution,  while  faced  with  incentives  that  punish 
severely any inconsistency in the answers. By that device he was able, in a sense, 
to implement a first-best optimum. That theory appeared terribly demanding 
of information among agents, but Piketty jI 993) has developed more plausible 
ways of getting the first best within the same general set of ideas. The simple 
model of incentive compatibility by no means exhausts the possible incentive 
mechanisms in situations of asymmetric information. 
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Among the other fields of application for asymmetric-information  are the 
control of firms by regulators, and pricing by utilities. In a very interesting line 
of development, first Baron and Myerson (1982),  and then Laffont and Tirole 
(1993)  have shown how one can analyse regulation by treating the firm as an 
agent who knows its cost structure, and the regulator as a principal who is 
uncertain about the firm's costs. The  firm's outputs and the prices it charges for 
them are related by market demand, and they are public information. One  way 
of thinking about regulation  is  to have an output-variable tax. This can be 
analysed using the methods I have described. 
Similarly, utilities face consumers  with varied  preferences,  and can relate 
price to quantity used in complex ways. As with the regulatory model, there are 
multiple  products,  and  one  should  consider  the  simultaneous  pricing  of 
consumption at different times. This gets really hard when consumers tastes 
vary in a multi-dimensional way. The simple techniques I have described are 
much less effective in such multi-dimensional problems, but Wilson (1993)  and 
Armstrong (1996) have made significant progress in solving problems of this 
type. 
In all  of  these  areas  of  application,  the  time  dimension  is  potentially 
important. Going back to the taxation problem, it can be seen that some new, 
and awkward  problems  arise. We can think  of  taxing each  generation, or 
cohort, in the way appropriate to them. Each will contribute to the common 
pool, but we can clearly identify the year of birth, and use that as a tax base. 
Theoretically, therefore, we should consider having a different tax system for 
each cohort.. Governments do not do that, and I will come back to why and 
whether we would like them to. 
It  is to be presumed that each individual's ability is quite strongly correlated 
with future ability. For simplicity consider a model whether everyone's wage 
remains  the same throughout  the working  life.  Some particular  incentive- 
compatible tax system applies to first-year income. People decide how hard to 
work, what to work at: some get high incomes, some low. If the theory already 
developed  applies,  people  with  higher  wages  will  choose  to  earn  higher 
incomes. Next year, the government knows what incomes they earned last year, 
and can therefore deduce their wage rates. Now it can tax on the basis of the  -
wage rate rather than income, that is  to say on the basic characteristic of the 
consumer. There is no longer any need to worry about incentives, not at least 
in the present period. Tax can be.made independent of income actually earned, 
and related simply to the wage (observed on the basis of performance in the 
previous period). On the margin, incentives are optimal. In effect the wage- 
related taxes implement lump-sum taxes, and would be expected to be high for 
high wage people, low, indeed negative, for low wage people. Indeed it turns 
out that in reasonable models, low wage people will be better off than high 
wage ones. 
If that is going to happen in the second  year, people in the first year will 
probably decide they would rather not earn enough to be labelled high wage. 
They  could  well  all  choose  the  same  income,  say  zero.  The second-year 
government cannot work out wages  after all, and everything collapses. The 19971  INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES  1323 
hoped-for optimum described is not an equilibrium. There is  an equilibrium 
with no-one doing anything, but it is extremely unsatisfactory. The trouble is 
that  in  the second  year,  it will  be  rational  for  the  government  to  act  as 
described. It is the anticipation of that rational behaviour by government that 
causes the trouble. What we have is a particularly bad case of intertemporal 
inconsistency. If the government can commit itself in advance to the tax system 
that will apply to the cohort in all future years, we can get back to the 'second- 
best' equilibrium already described as an optimal tax system. Probably it can 
do rather better than that. The puzzle  is  that governments do not, to any 
significant extent, commit themselves  to future tax rates, and indeed cannot  -
easily  do -so; and yet  the problem described does  not arise. By  accepting a 
convention that people born at different times are all subject to the same tax 
system, the government may be taken to provide such a guarantee, at the cost 
of giving up a desirable basis for tax discrimination. 
Perhaps  one should  not  mention  it  out loud.  Like  the man who  starts 
thinking about how  he manages  to walk, we  may get ourselves  in a lot of 
trouble by thinking. llie have the same problem that Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) identified  in macroeconomic policy. In microeconomic policy, we do 
not take it seriously. There is trouble lurking here, perhaps in the area of capital 
taxation. 
MORAL HAZARD 
In some degree, individual economic agents  are also  uncertain  about their 
tastes and abilities when they take decisions. The extreme case, where the agent 
is no better informed than the principal, is well known in insurance as moral 
hazard. If the agent's behaviour is unobservable, it is usually not possible to 
deduce the individual's action from performance when the connection between 
action and performance is uncertain. There are many relationships where this 
better describes  the situation than does  the asymmetric information model. 
Medical  care  has  been  regarded  as  a  prime  example  in  the  economics 
literat~re,~ perhaps surprisingly. Sharecropping with farmers paying for the 
use of land with a share of profits or income seems a good example, and so are 
many cases of  accident  insurance. Usually, of  course,  there are elements of 
each. I shall come to that at the end of the lecture. 
It is interesting to examine the consumption/income model as though it were 
a moral-hazard modeLg Suppose then that effective labour supply decisions are 
taken early in life, decisions how hard ta work in school or career choices. The 
consequences  are uncertain.  In the pure moral-hazard model,  everyone is 
identical at the point of decision. The government has to devise a tax schedule 
that will induce people to work  or try hard at that early stage, presumably 
making rewards increase with income, so that these prospects will encourage 
early effort. It might (in simple cases it would) have wanted everyone to have 
the same income, but then there would be no incentive to try hard initially. 
See Arrow (1963),who has something to say about asymmetric information too, and Pauly (1968). 
Such a model has been examined by Varian (1980). but my discussion will be primarily a translation 
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Problems of this kind are usually analysed with the assumption that people 
try to maximise their expected utility. There are some good reasons for thinking 
that may be a mistake.  At least the consequences of alternative theories  of 
decisions under uncertainty for these situations should be explored. But I shall 
go on with the conventional theory. 
Some particular level of effort is optimal. Incentives will have to be set up 
so that people will do it. If this is a nicely behaved problem, and in simple cases 
it is, we have to arrange that the marginal effect of effort on the expected utility 
of consumption takes some particular value. At the same time, the government 
is  constrained  by  the total consumption that is  going to be available when 
people do that amount of effort. Subject to these two constraints, it wants to 
maximise expected utility. To  get incentives right, some consumption levels will 
be low, presumably at lower income levels. At lower income levels, more effort 
will reduce the probability of that outcome. Reducing consumption improves 
incentives, though it lowers expected utility. 
It follows that consumption should be lowered most at income levels where 
the incentive improvement is greatest, relative to the utility loss, i.e. where the 
elasticity of output probability with respect to effort is great. A relative simple 
idea then: reduce consumption at observed  output levels where effort  has a 
large proportional effect on the probability of that level. 
There is a striking feature of the lognormal distribution of incomes for this 
model. If that is the nature of uncertainty about the effect of effort on income, 
the elasticity of probability with respect to effort tends to infinity as income goes 
to zero. Therefore, in the model, the government can achieve a very satisfactory 
outcome, almost as though the incentive constraint could be ignored, and it 
does that by instituting very low consumption at very low incomes. How much 
it can achieve that way depends on how low utility goes as consumption gets 
very small. 
This is very peculiar, and of course unacceptable. In this particular model, 
one reason why it is unacceptable is that people can in fact change their labour 
supply 'at the last minute'.  Another is  that it assumes people can calculate 
intelligently about events of very small probability, which is surely not always 
the case.  Finally,  the assumption  that all kinds of  effort to avoid very low- 
income  outcomes  automatically  increases  the  probability  of  high-income 
outcomes is  not realistic. 
Yet the analysis is trying to tell us something, something rather paradoxical. 
It is saying that incentives by means of punishments, which is  how we might 
describe very low consumption when there is  a very poor outcome, are most 
appropriate, if at all, in principallagent situations with moral hazard. These 
are cases where the agent does not know the consequences of actions. More 
precisely, punishment may be appropriate where actions have very uncertain 
consequences, spread over all possible outcomes. In the opposite case, where 
the agent  knows  very  well  the consequences  of  actions, punishment  is  not 
appropriate. It  just  might be best to have draconian punishments for serious 
car accidents, but not for deliberate crime. On the whole, I do not persuade 
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model  so as to remove  the most  extreme features of  the solution  to what is 
apparently the most straightforward and natural case. 
There is  one feature of these solutions that is  persuasive.  In cases such as 
employment relationships where it is  not possible  to impose  any very great 
punishment on the agent, dismissal will happen in a range of bad outcomes, 
and then rewards may rise rather rapidly over a range of outcomes. In such 
cases, one is getting a result not unlike a relationship of  authority, where an 
order is  given,  and expected  to be obeyed. Such a solution is  illustrated  in 
Fig. 4. 
Before-tax income 
Fig. 4. Optimum pay schedule under moral hazard. 
Often one gets perfectly  reasonable  payment schedules in such problems, 
with  payment,  or  rather  the  marginal  utility  of  payment,  related  to  the 
elasticity of probability with respect to effort. This gives some impression of the 
shape  of  the  payment  schedule,  but  exact  computations  are  somewhat 
troublesome. The method of solution indicated does not always work, however. 
There are cases, and they are not at all special, where one cannot well describe 
the moral hazard constraint, that is the constraint that incentives induce the 
desired level of effort, as a first-order condition the agent's choice must satisfy.10 
Sometimes  the  agent  should  be  made  indifferent  among  two  or  more 
alternatives,  and induced  to  choose just  one.  For  example, in  a  model  of 
optimal retirement, studied  by  Peter Diamond and me  (1g77),  it is  a main 
feature of  the optimum pension system that the agent, who is  subject to the 
random onset of disability, is  made indifferent as to the date of retirement, 
although only one particular  retirement date is  the right one. A very slight 
perturbation of the optimum schedule can induce the agent to choose that right 
retirement age for sure. 
It is  not always very easy to tell in advance what models can properly be 
solved  by  using  the  agent's  first-order  condition  as  a  constraint.  A  set  of 
sufficient  conditions I had conjectured  was shown to be  valid  by  Rogerson 
(1985).Surely more general conditions can be found. We have not come close 
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to identifying the boundaries between the different cases. It is striking that in 
the asymmetric-information  model  the method  of  taking  as  the incentive- 
compatibility constraint  essentially  the first-order  (calculus) conditions  for 
choice by the agent or agents works so well, at least in the sense that a simple, 
manageable and understandable condition is enough to justify it. When moral 
hazard is present, a different approach is needed. 
These complications make it particularly hard to give any general rules as to 
what we  would  want  or expect  payment schedules  to  look  like  when  the 
relationship between principal and agent involves moral hazard. The sharply 
rising middle section of  the payment curve that I have referred  to is  by  no 
means universal. Yet simple sharing rules are surprisingly difficult to generate 
with  plausible  examples.  It is  all  the  more  striking  that  Holmstrom  and 
Milgrom  (1987) have found  an example with  continuous action  over  time 
where incentives are linear. 
IMPERFECT INFORMATION IN GENERAL 
Although one should always seek simplicity, it is  necessary to consider what 
happens when there is asymmetric information, with the principal knowing less 
about the relationship between input and output than the agent who chooses 
input, but  the  agent  also  being  in some ignorance. As  the theory  of  these 
relationships  was  developed  in  the  I~~OS, it  was  found  that  new  forms  of 
contract arose. For concreteness,  let  us  talk about the consumption/income 
model again. Each consumer knows something about the effect of his labour on 
his income. It is different for different people,  and no-one knows it for sure. 
When  this  is  the  case,  there  is  a  natural  two-period  structure.  First,  the 
consumer chooses what to do; then, in the next period, the outcome becomes 
known. 
In these circumstances it is  almost always worthwhile for the principal to 
offer  a  choice  of  payment  schedules  to  consumers,  a  choice  that  is  to  be 
exercised before income is generated, indeed before the consumer knows what 
income he will get  as a result  of  his labour decisions.  There is  one schedule 
designed, perhaps one should say destined, for each type of consumer. Each 
consumer chooses the one that suits best. Unfortunately, the only examples that 
are fairly easy to work out are those where each agent's actions have a full range 
of possible effects, and consequently it is optimal to have a punishment schedule 
for each type of consumer. Maybe that is some kind of approximation to the 
optimal set of contracts between principal and agent, but the model is not very 
believable.  A  better  model,  with  consumers making  a  succession  of  labour 
supply decisions, needs to be worked out. It is unlikely that governments will 
adopt such complex tax systems,  or other principals  impose such  incentive 
systems on their agents, but we ought to get some sense of what the systems 
would look like, and by how much such possibilities might improve outcomes, 
both for principals and agents. 
The sense  that  the  degree  of  complexity  implied  by  optimal  design  of 
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make another step towards realism, and allow that consumers take a series of 
labour supply decisions  over time: education, career choice, early efforts  to 
achieve promotion, job search, practice and exercise, hours of work, years of 
work.  There  is  some  uncertainty  about  the  consequences  at each  stage, 
sometimes great, sometimes quite small. The formal structure of  the model 
implies that agents should be  offered  not just  choices among schedules, but 
choices among sets of schedules, among which choices will later be made. Pay 
or tax systems of that complexity are not conceivable. Why not?  You could say 
that humans are not intelligent enough to take decisions  of  the complexity 
required. More reasonably, it would be very costly to calculate the decisions, 
and it is undesirable to impose these decision costs on people. Part, perhaps a 
substantial part, of that cost  is  the cost  that results from making mistakes. 
Mistakes are not part of the standard economic models. 
Simplicity of contracts and systems is a slippery concept indeed. To  recognise 
the desirability of simplicity is not at all to conclude that simplest is best. There 
may well be many equally good ways of being simple. In the area of incentive 
systems, it is nice linear contracts that seem to be simple. For example, it is, and 
has long been, tempting to conclude that a constant marginal tax rate, the 
same for all incomes, would do perfectly well. Some at least of the calculations 
that I and others have done for the asymmetric-information problem suggest 
that there would not be a great cost in adopting such a system, as compared 
with an optimal one. At least it might do  just as well as any of the tax systems 
we have in our various countries. It has the appeal of neatness and elegance. 
The simplicity of so simple a tax system is not, I think, a great advantage over 
the slightly greater complexity of varying tax rates. The question is whether it 
would  be much worse  than an optimal tax system, and that deserves  to be 
estimated. 
But there are kinds of complexity that should still be studied. One particular 
example is the possibility  of relating taxation to wage rates, rather than only 
to income. I have touched on that obliquely several times already. It  is not at  all 
as easy to study as it may seem. The earlier discussion was couched in terms of 
wage rates, because they are concrete and readily understandable. Formally, 
the definition I was using was the ratio of income to a measure of the effort an 
individual is making. If effort were hours of work, it would be the wage rate in 
the  usual  sense.  Often  effort  cannot  be  measured  that  way.  Using  the 
conventionally measured wage rate, income divided by hours, as an element of 
the tax base would not, I suppose, add much to the use ofincome. It  is therefore 
unlikely that there is much advantage in so extending the tax system. What is 
really wanted is taxation in relation to occupation, to the type ofjob, perhaps, 
as well as income. I do not at all know what such a optimal tax system would 
look like. It would be interesting to find out. 
Another interesting set of questions concerns taxation at the upper end of the 
income scale, where the relationship between pay and productivity is often far 
from simple. Two examples come to mind, both in need of serious analysis. The 
first is managers whose pay comes from contracts arising from principallagent 
relationships within the firm. Because the contract of each manager will not in I 328  THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL  [SEPTEMBER 
each year equate pay to productivity, does that mean marginal tax rates should 
be adjusted appropriately? The problem is made the more interesting because 
the form of the contract between firm and manager is influenced by the form 
of taxation. 
The second example is that of rewards from innovation, invention, creation 
and competition. I  might say, the question is  how to treat prizes. The best 
singer may not be much better than the second-best, and may be primarily 
motivated by the wish to sing better than the second-best, or just to sing well. 
What does that tell us  about desirable incentive contracts, and, then, about 
taxation  at these levels? We may expect that marginal tax rates should  be 
rather higher if high incomes are indeed generated through competitions of this 
kind. 
Whenever one looks at a principal/agent situation, one can think of many 
ways in which incentives  might be  created. In recent years,  the theory  and 
practice of what is  variously  called  the design  of  economic  mechanisms, or 
contract  theory,  or  principal-agent  problems  has  gone  well  beyond  the 
situations discussed in this lecture. The account given here has been one-sided, 
for the principal always set the terms of the contract, and the agent took the 
actions. It is true that many economic relationships are one-sided, in just that 
way. Many others are not, and involve cooperative arrangements or bargains 
between  people  in  similar  situations.  It is  not  so  much  the  asymmetry  of 
information  that  is  special  about  principal-agent  relationships,  but  the 
asymmetry  of  responsibilities,  with  the  principal  moving  first,  the  agent 
following.  That makes  the  problems  easier,  and  so  we  have  made  some 
progress. Now we can better appreciate that anonymous market relationships 
are only a part of economic reality; perhaps not even the largest part. Most 
economic problems and possibilities involve instead relationships between and 
among individual agents, whether taxes, contracts and bargains, fights  and 
thefts, learning and search. It is a world still only imperfectly explored. 
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